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TROPICAL GEOMETRY AND MECHANISM DESIGN
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Abstract. We develop a novel framework to construct and analyze finite valued, mul-
tidimensional mechanisms using tropical convex geometry. We geometrically characterize
incentive compatibility using cells in the tropical convex hull of the type set. These cells
are the sets of incentive compatible payments and form tropical simplices, spanned by gen-
erating payments whose number equals the dimension of the simplex. The analysis of the
collection of incentive compatible mechanisms via tropical simplices and their generating
payments facilitates the use of geometric techniques. We use this view to derive a new geo-
metric characterization of revenue equivalence but also show how to handle multidimensional
mechanisms in the absence of revenue equivalence.
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Tropical Combinatorics, Incentive Compatibility, Cyclical Monotonicity, Revenue Equiva-
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1. Introduction
Mechanisms are engineered games, devised to implement outcomes that depend on the
private information of individuals in the economy, called their type. We consider deterministic
mechanisms with m ∈ N outcomes and quasi-linear utilities. In this setting types can be
represented by a set T ⊂ Rm. A mechanism is specified by pair of an outcome function
g : T → {1, . . .m} and a payment vector p ∈ Rm, taking a possibly false report s ∈ T of an
agent whose true type is t∗ to an outcome and a transfer, yielding utility t∗g(s) − pg(s). An
outcome function g is called incentive compatible (IC) if there is a payment vector p such
that truth-telling is an utility maximizing strategy.
Multidimensional mechanism design remains a hard topic, mainly because constructive
techniques known from single-dimensional settings no longer apply in more general models,
e.g. [MS02,MM88]. In this paper we develop geometric techniques to handle deterministic
multidimensional mechanisms using tropical convex geometry.
Rochet’s classical characterization [Roc87] states that an outcome function g is IC if and
only if it is cyclically monotone, meaning that the induced type graph on node set T with edge
weights lgs,t = tg(s) − tg(t) contains no negative weight cycles [Roc66, Lev99,GMV04,Voh11].
This characterization is implicit since it analyzes mechanisms via network flows in digraphs
induced by the outcome function. That is, given a type space T and an outcome function
g, deciding whether g is IC is possible by inspecting the type graph. However, given a type
space T and digraph all of whose cycles have non-negative weights, we lack an applicable
technique to decide whether this graph arose from some outcome function on T , and if so,
which outcome functions induced it. The difficulty is that cycle conditions do not encode
agent’s choices explicitly, and thus do not facilitate defining IC outcome functions from
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them, even though efforts have been undertaken to interpret these conditions economically,
e.g. [Rah10].
Another obstacle is the calculation of IC payments. Even if a given outcome function g is
known to be IC, the characterization of its IC payments P(g) is complex. It is well-known
that P(g) is a polytope described by m(m − 1) hyperplanes, one for each ordered pair of
outcomes. However, using this to gain a structural understanding of a mechanism’s pay-
ments proves difficult. Efforts to find usable characterizations of IC payments are ongoing,
[CE13,KM13]. For instance, Kos and Messner [KM13] gave ‘extremal payments’ which bound
all IC payments from above and below, but which are not sufficient to characterize P(g).
Absent a general characterization, the case in which P(g) consist of a single payment up to
addition of constants, known as revenue equivalence (RE), remains an essential ingredient for
mechanism design, as it has been from the outset [Mye81,Kle99]. A characterization of rev-
enue equivalence for outcome functions relying on the type graph was given by Heydenreich,
Mu¨ller, Uetz and Vohra [HMUV09]. In fact, the extremal payments of [KM13] can be seen as
a refinement of their result. Criteria on type spaces to force RE for any IC outcome function
have been obtained by Chung and Olszewski [CO07], but are quite involved. However, RE
precludes any re-distributive motives of information rents once the outcome function has
been fixed, an assumption that is restrictive in some economic contexts, see [CE13,KM13]
for a discussion and references.
In this paper we develop a novel geometric view on the study of mechanisms rooted in tropi-
cal geometry, thereby offering new perspectives on these problems. Tropical convex geometry
was developed to analyze combinatorial aspects of network flow problems geometrically. Our
core characterization result, Theorem 4.1, shows that there is a one-to-one correspondence
between the fundamental economic concepts of IC outcome functions and their payments,
and the basic objects of tropical convex geometry: tropical polytopes, covectors and tropical
eigenspaces. This simple observation provides a new constructive characterization of all IC
outcome functions together with their IC payments which is not based on cyclical mono-
tonicity, but instead on the tropical polytope generated by T , a polyhedral complex defined
from the type space whose cells naturally encode economic incentives. This novel view is
foundational for all our results. To discuss them, let us draw the parallels to the problems
we identified above.
Our approach provides the means to use cyclical monotonicity conditions constructively.
The allocation matrix Lg of the outcome function g : T → {1, . . . , m} is obtained from the
weighted digraph used in Rochet’s theorem by quotienting zero weight cycles, [Voh11]. Given
a matrix L and a type space T , we show in Theorem 5.2 how to decide whether there exist
an outcome function g such that L = Lg, and if so, how to explicitly construct these outcome
functions based on the geometry of the type space T .
Another contribution is the complete characterization IC payments. Consider again the
polytope P(g) of IC payments of g. An alternative to its hyperplane characterization would
be to present its vertices, from which all other payments could be written as convex combina-
tions. Unfortunately, these do not have a simple characterization and their number can range
from 1 to
(
2m−2
m−1
)
, [DS04, Prop. 19]. In contrast, in tropical algebra, P(g) is always a tropical
simplex. It can be written as the tropical convex hull of a unique minimal set of generating
elements whose number equals the dimension of P(g). We term these elements the tropical
generating payments and geometrically characterize them and their number in Theorems 4.8
and 4.11. This result demonstrates that tropical algebra is well-suited for working with IC
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payments, by intertwining algebraic and geometric techniques, providing a perspective not
available prior. It allows us to explicitly incorporate the geometry of T into the analysis in
ways that algebraic manipulation of incentive constraints does not. As a consequence we
obtain Corollary 4.15, which provides a novel characterization of RE outcome functions. It
refines the result on RE type spaces of [CO07] and gives an explicit, geometric characteriza-
tion of RE outcome functions, whose implicit and algebraic counterpart was established in
[HMUV09]. We elaborate on these connections in Section 4.3.
While rooted in the mathematics of tropical geometry, the objects we define naturally
represent economic incentives. Here we also argue that tropical geometry provides a com-
plementary picture to abstract cycle conditions for mechanism design. It is well known that
network flows can be cast in terms of tropical linear algebra [BCOQ92, But12], both are
very powerful tools to analyze a given outcome function [Voh11]. Indeed, in Section 4.2, we
utilize classical results on tropical eigenspaces to derive new results on generating IC pay-
ment. However, tropical geometry has tools from combinatorics, integer programming, and
algebraic geometry, which do not have an immediate network flow interpretation. Section 2
contains an informal discussion with examples to demonstrate the complementary geometric,
algebraic and combinatorial views on mechanisms tropical mathematics provides, and how
we utilize them to derive our results. For instance, Theorem 4.1, was achieved through the
combinatorics of tropical hyperplane arrangements. As a corollary, we show that the number
of IC outcome functions on any generic type space with m outcomes and r types is exactly(
r+m−1
m−1
)
. That is, while the exact set of outcome functions depends on the type space, their
number does not. Such results would be difficult to obtain from the network flow approach
alone.
Organization. Section 2 begins with an informal example to demonstrate our main points.
This section is fully self-contained. In Section 3 we recall the basic terminology of mech-
anisms and tropical convex geometry. This section also introduces our running example,
Example 3.12. In Section 4, we collect the main results of our geometric theory, and provide
an extensive discussion of its economic interpretation. In Section 5.1 we give a new result
on the characterization of allocation matrices. For clarity and ease of exposition, technical
generalizations to multi-player settings, generic and non-compact type spaces are given in
Section 6. All proofs are collected in Section 7. We conclude with a summary in Section 9.
Further Literature. While this paper is self-contained, it is not intended as an introduction
to tropical geometry. The mathematics we build on was pioneered by [DS04] and further
developed in [FR15, JL16], but tropical convex geometry and tropical linear algebra have a
much longer history, see [But12,BCOQ92]. For a fuller picture, see the monographs [But12,
BCOQ92] on solving tropical linear equations, or [Josb] on tropical combinatorics, and [MS15]
on tropical algebraic and convex geometry. We refer to [Zie12] for the basic terminology of
classical polyhedral geometry. The works of [BK12,BK16,TY15] are the first to apply tropical
geometry to microeconomic theory. Other applications include [Shi15, Jos] to trade theory
and [AGG12] to mean-payoff games. These works attest to fruitful interactions between
tropical geometry and economics.
Notation. For an integer n, define [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n}. If g : T → [m] is an outcome
function, then we shall denote its image in [m] by [g], and the cardinality of this set by
JgK. We use the underline notation, such as ⊕,⊙,H, . . . to indicate objects defined with
arithmetic done in the min-plus algebra, and the overline notation ⊕,⊙,H, . . . to indicate
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the same objects defined with arithmetic in the max-plus tropical algebra. Identify a graph
with its incidence matrix.
2. An Informal Overview and Example
We begin with an informal discussion. This section is fully self-contained and can be
skipped if the reader prefers delving into the formal definitions right away. Tropical math-
ematics provides two complementary perspectives on mechanism design, one via tropical
linear algebra, the other via tropical convex geometry. It is the interplay of these views that
distinguishes the tropical approach from other techniques.
Fix a type space T ⊂ Rm. If g : T → [m] is an outcome function we denote by P(g) ⊂ Rm
the set of IC prices, i.e. vectors p ∈ Rm that satisfy tg(t) − pg(t) ≥ tg(s) − pg(s) for all t, s ∈ T .
Conversely, given a price vector p ∈ Rm we denote by G(p) the set of outcome functions
g : T → [m] for which p is an IC price. First, we wish to understand the maps p 7→ G(p)
and g 7→ P(g) using tropical hyperplane arrangements. To simplify the discussion, suppose
that the outcome function g : T → [m] is onto and that T is compact. Let Vt : R
m → R be
the function that maps a payment vector p ∈ Rm to the negative of the equilibrium utility1,
that is,
Vt(p) = −max
s∈T
(tg(s) − pg(s)) = −max
i∈[m]
(ti − pi) = min
i∈[m]
(pi − ti).
This is a piecewise linear concave function on Rm, obtained as the point-wise minimum of
m classical hyperplanes. In tropical min-plus algebra (R,⊕,⊙) where tropical addition of
numbers is their minimum, a⊕b = min{a, b}, and tropical multiplication is the usual addition,
a⊙ b = a + b for a, b ∈ R, the function Vt becomes formally linear
Vt(p) = (−t)
⊤⊙ p =
⊕m
i=1
(−ti)⊙ pi. (1)
The set of points where Vt is not smooth is called the min-plus tropical hyperplane with
apex t, denoted H(−t). In economics terms these are prices p ∈ Rn at which the agent of
type t would be indifferent between two or more outcomes. Conversely, at any price p not
in the tropical hyperplane an agent of type t has a unique preferred outcome. The union
of all min-plus hyperplanes with apices in T is called the min-plus arrangement of T , and
is denoted H(−T ) :=
⋃
t∈T H(−t). This set partitions R
m into polyhedral regions called
cells. All prices p in the relative interior of a given cell σ induce the same set of preferred
outcomes for all types t ∈ T . Therefore, all prices p ∈ σ must have the same set of IC
outcome functions G(p). Conversely, each IC outcome function g has a payment p ∈ Rm,
which belongs to some cell. Thus, one can infer the maps p 7→ G(p) and g 7→ P(g) from
H(−T ). This is the main content of Proposition 3.3 and the key bridge between tropical
geometry and incentive compatibility.
Example 2.1 (Cells and outcome functions). Considerm = 3 outcomes. Notice that tropical
hyperplanes and thus the cells of the tropical min-plus arrangement are closed under addition
of constants. This leads to the definition of tropical affine space TA2, whose elements are
classes consisting of vectors in R3 which are tropical scalar multiples of each other, i.e. differ
by addition of constants. In economics terms, types depicted in TA2 are incentive types
rather than payoff types. Incentive types distill the economics of incentive compatibility.
Explicitly a point (x1, x2, x3) ∈ R
3 projected to the coset [(x1, x2, x3)] ∈ TA
2 can be depicted
1We chose the negative of the utility to be consistent with the sign convention in the tropical and cyclical
monotonicity literature.
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(a) Type in TA2 represented by the black
dots, with tropical min-plus arrangement in-
ducing a polyhedral decomposition of TA2.
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(b) A payment simples with tropical max-
plus arrangement. Generating payments are
labeled v1, v2, v3.
Figure 1. The type space T consists of the points {t1, . . . , t6} represented in TA2
as (x2 − x1, x3 − x1) in R
2 by normalizing the first coordinate to zero. Thus we may depict
figures in two instead of three dimensions. Fix a type set T = {t1, . . . , t6} ⊂ R3 represented
by the small black dots in Figure 1 (a). For instance, the payoff type t1 = (1, 1.5, 2) ∈ R3 is
represented in the figure as the class [(1, 1.5, 2)] = [(0, 0.5, 1)] in R2. At each point we also
depicted a min-plus tropical hyperplane using fine black lines. Each of the full-dimensional
regions in the figure is a cell. By the rational above the full-dimensional cells in this example
are in bijection with the IC outcome functions on T . Moreover, each of these cells equals the
IC payment set of the associated outcome function. It turns out that the full-dimensional,
bounded cells correspond to onto mechanisms, while the outcome functions corresponding to
full-dimensional, unbounded cells are not onto. Now consider the gray shaded cell and the
payment vector p = [(p1, p2, p3)] = [(0, 4, 2)] defined up to an additive constant. The set of
its IC outcome functions G(p) contains a unique IC g : T → [3] which is given by
g(t1) = g(t2) = 1, g(t3) = g(t4) = 2, g(t5) = g(t6) = 3.
The construction of outcome functions from cells follows from combinatorial data associated
to the arrangement known as covectors, defined in Section 3.2, but can also be carried out
geometrically as in Example 3.13, below.
The cells of the min-plus arrangement can be considered from a more abstract and alge-
braic viewpoint. Each bounded cell of the arrangement is a tropical simplex which enjoys
algebraic structure. Tropical simplices admit a unique minimal set of generators whose min-
plus linear span exactly equals the simplex. While each tropical simplex when viewed as an
ordinary convex polytope is also spanned as the classical convex hull of its vertices, these
vertices are difficult to characterize, and their number can range anywhere between 1 and(
2m−2
m−1
)
, [DS04, Prop. 19]. In contrast, in tropical algebra the generators are easily geometri-
cally characterized and their number always equals the dimension of the tropical simplex in
R
m, cf. Theorem 4.11. These complementary views between tropical convex geometry and
tropical linear algebra are not available for the orthodox techniques applied in the study of
mechanisms. In particular the equality between the number of algebraic generators and the
geometric dimension is a unique feature of tropical arithmetic.
The significance of these observations for economics become evident upon noting that all
IC payment sets are tropical simplices upon choosing definitions carefully, namely restricting
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(a) RE holds for gray shaded cells of the
tropical polytope.
(b) RE fails for gray shaded cells of the trop-
ical polytope.
Figure 2. The type space consists of three parallel lines. On this type space
RE and non-RE outcome functions coexist.
to the tropical polytope of T , i.e. the bounded cells of H(−T ). This allows us to give a unique
minimal set of generating payments for any outcome function sufficient to characterize all its
IC payments, cf. Theorem 4.8. The task of characterizing IC payments was picked up by
[KM13, CE13]. Kos and Messner [KM13] defined extremal payments which bound any IC
payment from above and below, but generally prove to be not a sufficient characterization.
Example 2.2 (Generating payments). Consider again the gray cell in Figure 1 which is
precisely P(g) for g from Example 2.1. Noting that this cell has dimension two in TA2 and
thus dimension three in R3, it has three generating payments which can be represented by the
gray points labeled v1 = (0, 5, 1), v2 = (0, 2, 2), v3 = (0, 6, 4) in Panel (b). These are sufficient
to fully characterize all IC payments for g as follows. Algebraically, for any q ∈ P(g) there
exist constants c1, c2, c3 ∈ R such that q = c1⊙ v1⊕c2⊙ v2⊕c3⊙ v3, moreover any such linear
combination is an IC payment for g. For instance, we may write
p = (0, 4, 2) = (1⊙ v1)⊕(2⊙ v2)⊕v3 = (1, 6, 2)⊕(2, 4, 4)⊕(0, 6, 4).
Geometrically, the gray cell equals the union of bounded cells of the max-plus tropical hyper-
plane arrangement on v1, v2, v3, depicted with black lines in Panel (b), cf. Remark 3.9. This
example also shows that generally two payments are not sufficient to characterize all IC pay-
ments. Indeed, in Example 4.19 we give a geometric construction of the extremal payments
of Kos and Messner, which can be represented by the points labeled v3 and r in Figure 1 (b).
Upon normalizing appropriately, the payment vector labeled s is bounded point-wise above
and below by v3 and r, respectively, but is not IC for g. Moreover, P(g) equals the ordi-
nary convex hull of 6 points, which matches the upper bound
(
4
2
)
, however, the reader will
check that the IC payment sets of other onto outcome functions on T , i.e. full-dimensional
bounded cells may have fewer vertices. This is not the case for tropical arithmetic, where all
full-dimensional bounded cells have exactly 3 tropical generators.
A very special case considered in the literature is that of revenue equivalence (RE). This
occurs exactly when there is only one generating payment. The link between the dimension
of cells and their number of generators equips us with a simple but powerful strategy to
give a geometric characterization of RE by analyzing the dimension of cells in the min-plus
arrangement on T . Our characterization of RE is presented in Corollary 4.15.
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Example 2.3 (RE via dimension of cells). To demonstrate our geometric view of RE con-
sider Figure 2. There the type space T consists of three parallel lines. Panel (a) depicts
the cells whose associated mechanisms are RE, panel (b) depicts the cells whose associated
mechanisms are not RE. The union of the gray regions coincides with the tropical polytope
generated by T , which can be identified with the IC payments of any IC outcome function
on T . Using approximations we see that payment simplices highlighted in panel (a) converge
to points, while those highlighted in panel (b) converge to vertical lines, as schematically
indicated. For instance, the payments represented by the two black dots in panel (b) can be
used as IC payments of the same outcome function, yet differ not just by a constant.
Using our view of RE we give geometric meaning to a characterization of RE of [HMUV09].
There it is shown that RE of an outcome function is equivalent to the anti-symmetry of
the graph-distance in its type graph. This connection is formalized in Corollary 4.17 and
serves once more to manifest the tight connection between tropical algebra and tropical
geometry. Importantly however, our result is formulated in terms of a geometric property
of cells of the tropical polytope which are a priory not related to outcome functions, while
the characterization in [HMUV09] is formulated as a property of type graphs induces by
IC outcome functions. It is therefore not clear how assumptions on the geometry of type
spaces affect the RE property. A recent result emphasizing a geometric view is due to [CO07,
Theorem 4], which states that a type space T is RE if and only if there do not exist disjoint
subsets B1, B2, a function r : B1 ∪ B2 → R, and an ǫ > 0, such that T equals the union of
two non-empty sets V+(B1, ǫ, r) and V−(B2, ǫ, r), whose definitions depend on the parameters
given. Yet their result pertains to type spaces as a whole and provides only an incomplete
understanding of type spaces on which RE and non-RE outcome functions coexist. Our result
can be applied using a straight-forward approximation technique and checking geometrically
that certain cells of the tropical polytope converge to points, providing a simple algorithm
that is applicable to any type space. It applies to subsets of all IC outcome functions and by
extension to type spaces globally providing us with a clear geometric understanding of the
RE property.
To conclude the discussion let us briefly return to the problem of deciding whether a given
type graph to which Rochet’s theorem is to be applied, arose on a fixed type space T and
if so, which outcome functions induced it. Let us call such graphs realizable on T . To
answer the realizability question we rely on the dual representation of tropical simplices by
hyperplanes. Indeed, each simplex possesses a dual representation via tropical hyperplanes.
Somewhat more surprisingly the same simplex can be represented in min-plus as well as max-
plus tropical arithmetic. Our characterization of realizability in Theorem 5.2 crucially relies
on these dual geometric representations of the simplices in H(−T ) enabling us to explicitly
relate to the geometry of the type space in question.
These examples illustrate that tropical mathematics is uniquely suited to analyze the cells
of H(−T ) which encode preferences and incentives to gain economic insights that would
be difficult to obtain using only established techniques. In particular tropical techniques
provide the geometric tools that allow us to visualize mechanisms and easily construct explicit
examples.
3. Mechanism Design and Tropical Geometry: an overview
3.1. Mechanisms and incentive compatibility. Consider a game with one agent and
m ∈ N possible outcomes. Fix T ⊂ Rm of possible preferences, called the type space, where
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ti measures the value of outcome i. To avoid technicalities in pathological cases, we shall
assume that T is compact. The theory for general T is discussed in Section 6.
A mechanism is a pair (g, p) consisting of an outcome function g : T → [m] and a payment
vector p ∈ Rm. At the beginning of the game, Nature chooses a true type t∗ ∈ T and
communicates it privately to the agent. The agent’s action is then to declare a type s ∈ T
to the mechanism, which may be different from the true type t∗. Upon announcing s, the
game ends with outcome g(s), and payment pg(s) by the agent to the mechanism. The agent,
knowing (g, p), will declare a type s ∈ T that maximizes utility,
u([g(s), p(s)], t∗) = t∗g(s) − pg(s).
Mechanisms under which the utility maximizing strategy is truth-telling are called incentive
compatible.
Definition 3.1. A mechanism (g, p) is incentive compatible (IC) if regardless of t∗ the agent
always maximizes utility by declaring the true type. That is,
t∗g(t∗) − pg(t∗) ≥ t
∗
g(s) − pg(s) for all s, t
∗ ∈ T. (IC)
An outcome function g : T → [m] is incentive compatible if there exists p ∈ Rm such that
(g, p) is IC.
We denote by [g] ⊂ [m] the image of g. The set of IC payments is defined to be
P(g) = {(pi : i ∈ [g]) ∈ R
[g] such that (g, p) is IC for some p ∈ Rm}. (2)
For a fixed p ∈ Rm, the set of IC outcome functions supported by p is
G(p) = {g : T → [m] such that (g, p) is IC}. (3)
For a fixed type space T , the set of IC outcome functions on T is
G = {g : T → [m] such that g is IC}.
3.2. Connections to tropical convex geometry. We now formalize the discussion from
Section 2. In the min-plus algebra (R∪{+∞},⊕,⊙) addition and multiplication are defined
by
a⊕b := min(a, b), a⊙ b := a+ b for a, b ∈ R∪{+∞}.
Analogously, the max-plus algebra (R ∪ {−∞},⊕,⊙) is defined by
a⊕b := max(a, b), a⊙ b := a+ b for a, b ∈ R∪{−∞}.
All definitions stated in the min-plus algebra above have analogous definitions in the max-
plus algebra. As we shall see, for certain economic concepts it is more natural to work with
max, while for others it is more natural to work with min. Therefore we retain both algebras
in this paper.
As discussed above, a fixed t ∈ Rm defines the min-plus linear function Vt in (1), interpreted
as the negative of the equilibrium utility for an agent with true type t. For I ⊆ [m], sector
I of the min-plus arrangement at t is defined to be the closed cone
HI(−t) := {z ∈ R
m : zi − ti ≤ zj − tj for all i ∈ I, j ∈ [m]}.
Clearly for any pair I, J ⊆ [m], we have HI∪J(−t) = HI(−t) ∩ HJ(−t), so the collection
of these closed cones forms a polyhedral fan in Rm, [Zie12, Sec. 7.1], called the min-plus
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arrangement of t, and denoted H(−t). For a subset T ⊂ Rm the min-plus arrangement of T
is the polyhedral complex obtained as the refinement of the fans H(−t) for all t ∈ T ,
H(−T ) :=
∧
t∈T
H(−t).
Each closed cell σ of H(−T ) is obtained as the intersection
σ =
⋂
t∈T
HI(σ,t)(−t) (4)
where I(σ, t) ⊆ [m] for each t ∈ T . The tuple (I(σ, t) : t ∈ T ) uniquely specifies σ, and is
called its min-plus covector, denoted coVec(σ). The min-plus covector of a point p ∈ Rm,
denoted coVec(p), is the covector of the smallest cell that contains p. The following lemma
gives a convenient way to think of covectors as a collection of bipartite graphs.
Lemma 3.2. For p ∈ Rm, coVec(p) is the bipartite graph with nodes [m]× T , where (i, t) ∈
[m]× T is an edge of this graph if and only if p ∈ Hi(−t).
Identify an outcome function g : T → [m] with its graph g on [m] × T , where g(t) = i if
and only if (i, t) is an edge of the graph g. The following proposition links the covector of p
with respect to H(−T ) to G(p). As discussed in Section 2, this is the fundamental geometric
connection between incentive compatibility problems and tropical geometry.
Proposition 3.3. Let g : T → [m] be an outcome function, and p ∈ Rm be a price vector.
Then g ∈ G(p) if and only if g is a subgraph of coVecT (p).
We now turn to the study of IC payments via the max-plus tropical convex hull of the type
set T . The appearance of max instead of min in this name is the consequence of the trivial
min-max duality, namely, min(a, b) = −max(−a,−b).
Definition 3.4. The max-plus convex hull generated by T , denoted tconv(T ), is polyhedral
complex consisting of all cells in H(−T ) which are bounded up to addition of constants.
This name is motivated by the fact that for a finite set T , tconv(T ) coincides with the
max-plus polytope generated by T , defined as the max-plus linear span of the points in T
[DS04, Prop. 4]. While every payment induces some IC outcome function, the following key
result states that only payments that lie in tconv(T ) are interesting for economic applications.
Definition 3.5. Let g : T → [m] be an outcome function. The cell of g is the unique
maximal cell of tconv(T ) whose covector contains g as its subgraph. That is,
P↑(g) := {q ∈ tconv(T ) : q ∈ Hi(−t) for all (i, t) ∈ g}. (5)
If no such cell exists, define P↑(g) = ∅.
Unlike P(g), which is a polytope in RM for some M < m when g is not onto, the cell P↑(g)
is always a polytope in Rm when T is compact.
Proposition 3.6 below shows that there is an isomorphism between P(g) and P↑(g). As
we shall prove below, this isomorphism has many desirable properties. Most importantly, it
implies that the polyhedral complex tconv(T ) represents all possible IC payment sets of all
possible IC outcome functions on T .
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Proposition 3.6. Let g : T → [m] be an outcome function and [g] ⊆ [m] its image. The
projection πg : R
m → R[g] defined by
πM (p) = (pi : i ∈ [g])
is an affine isomorphism from P↑(g) to P(g). In particular, the dimensions of P(g) and
P↑(g) agree.
Corollary 3.7. The outcome function g is IC if and only if its cell P↑(g) is non-empty.
Suppose we pick a vector p ∈ Rm and utilize Proposition 3.3 to infer the set G(p) of all IC
outcome functions supported by p. In general, p needn’t be in the set
⋃
g∈G(p)P
↑(g) of all IC
payments compatible with these outcome functions. By Proposition 3.6 this cannot happen
if p ∈ tconv(T ). However, even then, this set may not be a cell in the tropical polytope. This
is only guaranteed if G(p) is a singleton. The following proposition shows when this is the
case. It is an essential stepping stone for our effort to establish a well-defined correspondence
between and outcome functions. The proposition also highlights the roles of the covector in
finding g, and the role of tconv(T ) in finding P↑(g).
Proposition 3.8. Let p ∈ Rm. Then G(p) contains a single IC outcome g if and only if p
lies in the interior of a full-dimensional cell σ of H(−T ). In this case, g is given by
g(t) = i ⇐⇒ (i, t) ∈ coVecT(σ), (6)
and P↑(g) = σ ∩ tconv(T ).
Remark 3.9. The switch between min and max, from hyperplanes to the convex hull is
a consequence of min(a, b) = −max(−a,−b). It is not to be confused with the duality
theorem between the V and H-representation of tropical polytopes, which states that tropical
max-plus polytopes can be written as the intersection of min-plus hyperplanes, as well as
the max-plus convex hull of a unique minimal generating set, called its tropical vertices
[DS04, GK11, Jos05]. Similarly min-plus polytopes have a V - and H-representation. In
fact, the set of IC payments P(g) is both a min- and a max-plus polytope [JK10, JL16].
Its H-representation as a max-plus polytope is precisely the cell of g. In contrast, its V -
representation as a min-plus polytope is given in Theorem 4.8.
Remark 3.10. All tropical arrangements have a common lineality space
R ·(1, . . . , 1) = R⊙(0, . . . , 0).
Hence so does the tropical polytope and the set of IC payments. In tropical geometry, it is
customary to work modulo this lineality space. This leads to the (m−1)-dimensional tropical
affine space TAm−1,
TA
m−1 ≡ Rm /R ·(1, . . . , 1).
For figures, we shall identify TAm−1 with Rm−1 via the homeomorphism
[x] := {a⊙ (x1, . . . , xm) : a ∈ R} ∈ TA
m−1 7→ (x2 − x1, . . . , xm − x1) ∈ R
m−1 . (7)
Tropical affine space is the natural ambient space to study incentive problems. In economic
terms, this means that only relative valuation of the agent matter for truthfulness. The notion
of ‘type’ in TAm−1, which is formally a coset, is more accurately described as incentive type.
However, we will not afford this distinction trusting that no confusion will arise.
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3.3. Examples. Examples 3.11 and 3.12 below illustrate the definitions of sectors, tropical
arrangements and covectors. Example 3.13 foreshadows our main results.
Example 3.11 (Tropical arrangements and sectors). Figure 3(a) depicts the arrangement
H(−t0) and its sectors in TA
2 identified with R2 via (7). The three lines are the three lower-
dimensional sectors H12(−t0), H13(−t0), and H23(−t0). The apex t0 = H(−t){1,2,3} is where
these sectors meet. Panel (b) shows the max-plus arrangement H(−t0) together with its
sectors.
[e3 − e1]
[e2 − e1][0]
t0 = [(0, 4, 2)]
H1(−t0)
H3(−t0)
H2(−t0)
(a) A min-plus arrangement with its sectors.
[e3 − e1]
[e2 − e1][0]
t0 = [(0, 4, 2)]
H1(−t0)
H2(−t0)
H3(−t0)
(b) A max-plus arrangement with its sectors.
Figure 3. Min-plus and max-plus arrangements with labeled sectors in two-
dimensional tropical affine space TA2.
Example 3.12 (Covectors, Tropical Polytopes). Figure 4 depicts type set T = {t1, t2, t3, t4}
together with the min-plus arrangement H(−T ). The subcomplex of bounded cells is shaded
gray. It is the tropical polytope generated by T , tconv(T ). Matrices in the figure are the
[e3 − e1]
[e2 − e1][0]
t2
t1
t3
t4


1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0




0 1 0 0
1 0 1 1
0 1 0 0




1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0




0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
1 1 0 0



1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1
1 1 0 0


p
r u
s
q
Figure 4. A min-plus arrangement on four points labeled with some of its
covectors. The tropical polytope generated by the points is shaded gray.
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covectors of a selection of cells in tconv(T ). Consider the matrices
h =

0 0 0 00 0 1 1
1 1 0 0

 , h′ =

0 0 1 00 0 1 1
1 1 0 0

 .
The matrix h defines a cell τ of tconv(T ) by restricting H3(−t1)∩H3(−t2)∩H2(−t3)∩H2(−t4)
to tconv(T ), provided the intersection is not empty. In fact, τ is the line connecting the points
labeled s and t3. But the covector of this cell is h
′ which is different from h. Thus h is not a
covector of tconv(T ).
Example 3.13 (Geometric and algebraic construction of IC mechanisms). This example
illustrates Propositions 3.3 and 3.6. In Figure 4, let σ be the cell of tconv(T ) that contains
p. Since σ is full-dimensional, by Proposition 3.8, there is a unique IC g : T → [3] with this
payment p, namely,
g(t1) = g(t3) = 1, g(t4) = 2, g(t2) = 3.
The max-plus arrangement H(−p) at p (dotted) can be used to define g geometrically:
g(t) = i if and only if t ∈ T ∩ Hi(−p). Since g is onto, by Proposition 3.6, P (g) = σ.
Example 3.14 (Construction of IC mechanisms (cont.)). In Figure 4, consider the point
r. Let ν be the cell of tconv(T ) that contains r in its relative interior. This cell is the
line segment between t2 and u. The graph that corresponds to the covector of ν has two
subgraphs defining outcome functions on T , whose adjacency matrices are
f1 =

0 0 0 01 0 1 1
0 1 0 0

 , f2 =

0 1 0 01 0 1 1
0 0 0 0

 .
By Proposition 3.3, G(r) consists of two IC outcome functions f1, f2 : T → [3], with
f1(t2) = 1, f1(t1) = f1(t3) = f1(t4) = 2, and f2(t2) = 3, f2(t1) = f2(t3) = f2(t4) = 2.
Again, H(−r) can be used to determine G(r). Here, t2 ∈ T ∩ H1(−r) ∩ H3(−r), reflecting
the fact that t2 can be assigned to either outcome 1 or 3 without violating IC. Then, modulo
addition of constants, P(f1) ⊂ R
{1,2}, and P(f2) ⊂ R
{2,3} are one-dimensional polytopes,
which can be lifted to P↑(f1) = P
↑(f1) = ν in R
3 by Proposition 3.6. The lifting preserves
the dimension of the cells.
4. Main results
4.1. Global structure of IC outcome functions and payments. Theorem 4.1 below
gives a characterization for G and P in terms of H(−T ) and tconv(T ). This result solves for
the global structure of the collection of all IC outcome functions on T . To avoid technicalities,
we state the case when T is tropically generic. The general case can be reduced to this case
through generic perturbations, and is treated in Section 6. A set T ⊂ Rm is tropically generic
if there is no subset of 2 ≤ k ≤ m points in T whose projection onto k coordinates lie on
a tropical hyperplane in Rk. For example, finitely many points picked independently from
some continuous distribution in Rm are almost surely generic.
Theorem 4.1. Fix a tropically generic type space T ⊂ Rm. Then g is an IC outcome on T
if and only if it equals coVecT(σ) for some full-dimensional cell σ of H(−T ). In this case,
P↑(g) = σ ∩ tconv(T ).
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Corollary 4.2. Fix a tropically generic type space T ⊂ Rm. Then g ∈ G is an onto IC
outcome function if and only if its corresponding cell σ is a full-dimensional cell of tconv(T ).
Proposition 3.8 shows that each full-dimensional cell of H(−T ) gives rise to a unique IC
outcome function g. The above theorem completes the characterization by showing that on
generic T any IC outcome function is associated to a cell. Thus we obtain a bijection between
full dimensional cells and IC outcome functions. Furthermore, when T is generic, the number
of full-dimensional cells of H(−T ) and tconv(T ) only depends on the cardinality of T and
the dimension m [DS04, Cor. 25]. Consequently, if two generic type spaces have an equal
number of types, then so is the number of IC, and onto IC outcome functions.
Corollary 4.3. Suppose T ∈ Rm is tropically generic and contains r points. Then the
number of IC outcome functions on T equals
(
r+m−1
m−1
)
, and the number of onto IC outcome
functions on T equals
(
r+m−4
m−1
)
.
Example 4.4. Consider Figure 5, which reproduces parts of Example 3.12. Again, the
tropical polytope on T = {t1, t2, t3, t4} is shaded grey. The type space is generic, since no
three points lie on the same hyperplane, and no two points project onto the same point on
either of the axes. There are three bounded, full-dimensional cells, and thus exactly three
onto mechanism by Theorem 4.1,
g1 =

1 0 0 00 0 1 1
0 1 0 0

 , g2 =

1 0 1 00 0 0 1
0 1 0 0

 , g3 =

0 0 1 01 1 0 0
0 0 0 1

 .
t2
t1
t3
t4g1 g2
g3
h1 h2 h3 h4
h5
h6
h7
h8h9
h10
h11
h12
Figure 5. A min-plus arrangement on four points. The tropical polytope
generated by the points is shaded gray. All full-dimensional cells of the ar-
rangement are labeled by their covectors.
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Moreover, there are 12 non-surjective mechanisms, each associated with one full-dimensional
cell of H(−T ).
h1 =

1 0 0 00 1 1 1
0 0 0 0

 , h2 =

1 1 0 00 0 1 1
0 0 0 0

 , h3 =

1 1 1 00 0 0 1
0 0 0 0

 , h4 =

1 1 1 10 0 0 0
0 0 0 0


h5 =

1 1 0 10 0 0 0
0 0 1 0

 , h6 =

1 0 1 00 0 0 0
0 1 0 1

 , h7 =

0 0 1 00 0 0 0
1 1 0 1

 , h8 =

0 0 0 00 0 0 0
1 1 1 1


h9 =

0 0 0 00 0 0 1
1 1 1 0

 , h10 =

0 0 0 00 0 1 1
1 1 0 0

 , h11 =

0 0 0 01 1 0 1
0 0 1 0

 , h12 =

0 0 0 01 1 1 1
0 0 0 0


Note that for these mechanisms, the set of IC payments can be identified with the intersection
of the corresponding cell in H(−T ) with the tropical polytope tconv(T ). Thus, as Corollary
4.3 predicts, there are 15 mechanisms on T in total, and 3 onto mechanisms.
4.2. Tropical algebra of IC payments. We now apply classical theorems on the decompo-
sition of tropical eigenspaces to obtain new results on the structure of P(g). Let g : T → [m]
be an outcome function with image set [g] ⊆ [m], whose cardinality we denote by JgK. The
allocation matrix Lg ∈ R[g]×[g] of g is defined by
Lgjk := inf
t∈g−1(j)
{tj − tk} for all j, k ∈ [g]. (8)
Algebraic manipulations show that
P(g) = {p ∈ R[g] : pi−pj ≤ L
g
ij , ∀ i, j ∈ [g]} = {p ∈ R
[g] : min
j=1,...,m
Lgij+pj = pi, ∀ i ∈ [g]}. (9)
Rewriting (IC) with matrix-vector and scalar-vector multiplication carried out in the min-
plus algebra we obtain
Eig(Lg) = {p ∈ R[g] : Lg ⊙ p = 0 ⊙ p}, (10)
which is the min-plus eigenspace of the allocation matrix Lg with eigenvalue zero. Therefore,
one obtains the following key result.
Corollary 4.5. Let g : T → [m] be an outcome function. Then P(g) equals the min-plus
eigenspace of Lg with eigenvalue zero.
It turns out that the min-plus eigenvalue of a Lg matrix is unique and equals the minimum
normalized cycle in the graph with edge weights Lg [CG62]. Therefore, one recovers Rochet’s
cyclical monotonicity condition for incentive compatibility [Roc87], namely, that g is IC if
and only if all cycles of Lg are nonnegative.
Theorem 4.6 ([CG62], [Roc87]). An outcome function g is IC if and only if the alloca-
tion matrix Lg has min-plus tropical eigenvalue zero, or equivalently, all cycles of Lg are
nonnegative.
Suppose Lg ∈ R[g]×[g] has min-plus eigenvalue zero. The Kleene star of Lg is the matrix
(Lg)∗ = I⊕
(⊕JgK
i=1
(Lg)⊙i
)
,
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where I denotes the min-plus identity matrix with zero on the diagonal and +∞ on the
off-diagonal. Kleene stars are also known as distance matrices [Mur03], or strong transitive
closures [But12, §1.6.2.1]. Computing the Kleene star is equivalent to computing the all-
pairs shortest path in the graph with edge weights Lg, which can be cast as a linear program
[AMO93]. Classical results in tropical linear algebra [MS15, Thm. 5.1.3], [But12, Thm 4.2.4]
immediately translate into the following algebraic characterization of IC payments.
Definition 4.7. Let g : T → [m] be an IC outcome function and Lg ∈ R[g]×[g] its allocation
matrix. The set of tropical generating payments V (P(g)) of P(g) is the set of columns of
(Lg)∗ viewed as points in TAJgK−1.
Theorem 4.8. Let g : T → [m] be an IC outcome function. Each p ∈ P(g) can be written
as a min-plus linear combination of vectors in V (P(g)), that is,
p =
⊕
v∈V (P(g))
av ⊙ v
for some av ∈ R. Furthermore, the cardinality of V (P(g)) equals the dimension of P(g).
A brief discussion is in order. The theorem states that a price is IC if and only if it can
be written as a min-plus linear combination of the tropical generating payments. Indeed,
adding constants to payments does not violate IC, neither does taking point-wise minima of
IC payments. The surprising part is that all payments are obtainable this way. Note that
this is only true using tropical algebra. In fact, tropical generating payments are ordinary
vertices of P(g), but the converse is not true. The number of ordinary vertices of P(g) ranges
between 1 and
(
2JgK−2
JgK−1
)
[DS04, Prop. 19], while the number of tropical generating payments
equals the dimension which is always between 1 and JgK. Thus the set of IC payments P(g)
thus forms a tropical simplex spanned by the generating payments.
The i-th column of (Lg)∗ consists of the shortest paths from each of the d nodes towards
node i, that is
(Lg)∗ij = sup{pi − pj : p ∈ P(g)}, for all i, j ∈ [g]. (11)
In economics terms, the entries of the Kleene star are the maximal payment differentials
between outcomes consistent with IC of g, by this we mean the following. Fixing a price for
outcome i, the number (Lgij)
∗ is the maximal payment difference the mechanism can charge
between outcome i and j. If the difference were higher, then some type in g−1(j) would find
it optimal to deviate to some outcome k 6= j, thereby violating IC.
Example 4.9 (Generating Payments). Consider the outcome function g from Example 3.13.
Its IC payment simplex P(g) is the cell containing p in its interior in Figure 4. The generators
can be calculated using (11) and are given by v1 = [(0, 17, 6)], v2 = [(0, 10, 6)] = [(−10, 0,−4)],
v3 = [(0, 15, 2)] = [(−2, 13, 0)]. If p
′ = (0, 17, 6) ∈ v1 is the IC price for the mechanism (g, p),
then p′2 = 17 is the maximal price that supports outcome 2. If it were increased, then t4 would
deviate and announce t1 or t3. By Theorem 4.8, the payment simplex P(g) equals themin-plus
linear span of the generators v1, v2, v3 or equivalently the union of bounded cells in the max-
plus arrangement on these points, see Remark 3.9. Both characterize the min-plus convex
hull tconv(v1, v2, v3) by [DS04, Thm. 15]. For instance, the IC price p = [(0, 15, 3)] depicted
in the figure can be expressed as a min-plus linear combination as p = 5⊙ v1⊕0⊙ v2⊕1⊙ v3.
However, the classical convex hull of the generating payments is a strict subset of P(g).
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The set of generating payments V (P(g)) is given by the columns of the Kleene star (Lg)∗
viewed as vectors in TAJgK−1. While the Kleene star (Lg)∗ has JgK columns, two columns
which differ by a constant entry-wise are the same point in TAJgK−1. Hence, the cardinality
of V (P(g)) is between 1 and JgK. We now give a geometric characterization of the number
of generating payments.
Definition 4.10. For p ∈ TAm−1, the dimension graph of p with respect to T is the graph
on m nodes, with edge {i, j} if and only if
T ∩ Hij(−p) 6= ∅. (12)
Observe that for each pair {i, j}, the sector Hij(−p) is a translation of the sector Hij(0)
by p. Hence calculating the dimension graph of a point allows for a simple geometric algorithm
by considering translations of the sets Hij(0) and checking whether they intersect T , or
conversely, translating T and checking whether it intersects Hij(0).
Theorem 4.11. Let g : T → [m] be an IC outcome function and p be a point in the relative
interior of P↑(g). Then the number of generating payments equals the number of connected
components in the dimension graph of p with respect to T .
Example 4.12 (Dimension graph and number of generating payments). We continue with
the setting of Example 4.9. The dimension graph of p is given by 3 nodes with no edges, since
T ∩ Hij(−p) = ∅ for all i 6= j, see Figure 4 . By Theorem 4.11 we conclude that there are
exactly three generating payments for g, which were calculated in Example 4.9. Recall that
the cell P(g) is depicted in TA2, where its dimension is two. Accounting for the quotiented
lineality space (0, 0, 0)⊙ R, the cell has dimension three in R3. So this number agrees with
the dimension of P(g) as a polyhedron in R3 as expected from Theorem 4.8.
By Theorem 4.8 the generating payments V (P(g)) are the unique generators of the tropical
eigenspace of Lg. Theorem 4.11 characterizes their number in terms of a geometric property of
the cell P↑(g). The representation in terms of generators is dual to the hyperplane description
of the price simplex from Proposition 3.6, cf. Remark 3.9. In other words V (P(g)) is also the
set of tropical vertices of P(g). Yet it is the geometric aspect manifested in Theorem 4.11
and the calculation in (11) that makes the characterization of Theorem 4.8 appealing, for
it does not require reference to Lg but instead provides a direct link to the geometry of T
via tconv(T ). The tropical apparatus is uniquely suited for this task by bridging algebraic
and geometric techniques. Indeed, the link between the number of algebraic generators and
geometric dimension parallels classical linear algebra. It shows how the cells of the tropical
polytope tconv(T ) can be used to study mechanisms. For instance, in Section 4.3 we derive
a novel geometric characterization of revenue equivalence.
Remark 4.13. We offer a remark on Theorems 4.8 and 4.11. One is stated in terms of
P(g), the potentially lower dimensional payment set defined in (2), while the other is stated
in terms of P↑(g), the embedding of the payment set into the tropical convex hull tconv(T ),
defined in (5). By Proposition 3.6, the cells P(g) ⊂ R[g] and P↑(g) ⊂ Rm are isomorphic as
tropical simplices, so that their dimension and the number of tropical vertices agrees. The
calculation in (11) can be carried out for all i, j ∈ [m] on P↑(g), thereby lifting the tropical
generating payments from R[g] to Rm to obtain a V -representation of P↑(g). In other words,
the two theorems are fully compatible. In examples, for visualization purposes, it is often
more convenient to work with P↑(g). In algebraic descriptions, as in Theorem 4.8, it is more
natural to work with P(g).
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Example 4.14 (Example 4.12 continued). Consider now the mechanism f1 from Exam-
ple 3.14 and the cell ν = P↑(f1) given by the line segment connecting t2 and u. Inspecting
Figure 4, we note that the dimension graph of any point r in the relative interior of ν has
edges {1, 3}, hence two connected components. The set of IC payments is generated by ex-
actly two prices which can be seen to be the points t2 and u. Thus, calculating the columns
of (Lf1)∗ ∈ R3×3 from P↑(f1) by means of (14), returns two tropically linearly dependent
columns, reflecting the fact that the cell is not of full dimension.
4.3. Generating payments and revenue equivalence. There has been an effort to obtain
a general characterization of the set of IC payments, see [KM13,CE13]. Kos and Messner
[KM13, Theorem 1] showed that the supporting payments of an IC outcome function g satisfy
type-wise upper and lower bounds, which they termed “extremal payments”. However, while
extremal payments themselves are IC prices, boundedness by extremal payments is generally
not sufficient for a payment rule to be IC. In contrast, generating payments completely
characterize IC prices. Moreover, Theorems 4.8 and 4.11 show that they provide a minimal
characterization and that their number is related to the geometry of the type space.
Extremal payments are defined in terms of certain path-weights in the type graph of
g, obtained by refining the results of [Roc87, HMUV09], and extending [CO07, Prop. 2].
Geometrically they correspond to two extremal points in P↑(g). Indeed, the upper and lower
bounds are the coordinate-wise maximal, respectively minimal points in P↑(g) ∈ tconv(T ).
Examples 4.19 and 4.20 detail this construction showing how obtain an equivalent definition
that is path weight free. It was argued in [KM13, Sec. 7] that such a definition is desirable.
Moreover they show how our geometric tools naturally lend themselves to the economic
analysis of equilibrium utilities and the distribution of information rents.
If the upper and lower bounds on IC payments coincide, then an IC outcome function is
said to be revenue equivalent (RE). In other words, g is RE, if its set of incentive compatible
payments P(g) consists of exactly one point up to tropical scalar multiplication. A type space
is revenue equivalent if any IC outcome function defined on it is RE. The literature on revenue
equivalence is vast [Mye81,MS02,KM01,JMS96,Voh11,HMUV09,CO07], see [CO07,Voh11]
for a comprehensive review. As a direct consequence of Theorem 4.11 and Proposition 3.6,
we obtain the following new characterization of revenue equivalence relating geometry and
algebra.
Corollary 4.15. Let g be an IC outcome function. Then g is revenue equivalent, if and
only if the dimension graph of p ∈ P↑(g) is connected, which is the case if and only if the
dimension of P(g) is zero.
This characterization provides a unified framework for our study of both, the revenue
equivalence of outcome functions, and that of type spaces. The key point is that it treats
RE as a property of cells of tconv(T ). A benefit of this view is that it provides an explicit
characterization of RE rooted in the geometry of the type space. Another benefit is that
the characterization extends to collections of cells, and thus to subsets of the set of all IC
mechanisms. The following example demonstrates these points.
Example 4.16 (RE via Corollary 4.15). Consider Figure 6 where the type space is given by
three parallel copies of an interval, depicted using black lines in panel (b). The black dots
in panel (a) are a discrete approximation, for which we also indicated the cell structure of
the tropical polytope. The tropical polytopes are shaded gray in both panels. A limiting
argument using finite approximations shows that all cells converge to points in the region
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(a) Discrete approximation of type space
with tropical polytope and cells.
RE fails
RE holds
(b) Type space with tropical polytope.
Figure 6. A type space on which RE and non-RE outcome functions coexist.
which is not shaded in the line pattern, see Example 6.5. For these cells RE holds by
Corollary 4.15. In the two triangular regions shared with the line pattern, RE fails. There
cells converge to vertical line segments. Using Definition 4.10 one verifies that the dimension
graph has edges between the nodes labeled 1 and 2, while the node with label 3 is isolated.
Hence the payment simplex has dimension two. Indeed, in panel (b) we depicted two prices
that support the same outcome function yet differ modulo addition of constants.
Two corollaries of Theorem 4.11, related to Corollary 4.15 should not go unmentioned, as
they connect our results to the existing literature.
Corollary 4.17. Let g : T → [m] be IC and let Lg be its allocation matrix. For p in the
relative interior of P↑(g) the following are equivalent.
(1) The dimension graph of p is connected.
(2) The outcome function g is revenue equivalent.
(3) The matrix (Lg)∗ is skew-symmetric.
Corollary 4.18. Let T ⊂ Rm be a type space. The following are equivalent.
(1) For each p ∈ tconv(T ) the graph of p is connected.
(2) The type space T is revenue equivalent.
The equivalence of parts (2) and (3) in Corollary 4.17 is the result obtained by Heydenreich,
Mu¨ller, Uetz and Vohra [HMUV09, Theorem 1], for finite outcome functions. Since the Kleene
star (Lg)∗ records the length of shortest paths, its skew symmetry is equivalent to the anti-
symmetry of the graph distance defined in [HMUV09]. We augment this characterization
by the geometric condition (1), which can be verified on the min-plus arrangement H(−T ).
It makes the study of the RE property explicit and does not necessitate passing to induced
allocation matrices.
Corollary 4.18 gives an alternative characterization for RE type spaces. A recent result
in this vein is due to Chung and Olszewski [CO07, Theorem 4], which states that T is RE
if and only if there do not exist disjoint subsets B1, B2, a function r : B1 ∪ B2 → R, and
an ǫ > 0, such that T equals the union of two non-empty sets V+(B1, ǫ, r) and V−(B2, ǫ, r),
whose definitions depend on the parameters given. Given a specific type space T , it is not
immediate how to apply this theorem to check whether T is RE, while checking whether a
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type space is RE using Corollary 4.18 via the geometric algorithm described following the
definition of the dimension graph is surprisingly simple. Example 4.16 demonstrates this.
As pointed out in [HMUV09], results which establish RE of a type space have limited
applicability, as there are type spaces on which RE and non-RE outcome functions coexist.
Corollary 4.15 is immune to this scrutiny. The emphasis on cells allows for the analysis of
type spaces in light of geometry. It combines the analytic detail of a characterization of the
RE property on the level of outcome functions from Heydenreich, Mu¨ller, Uetz and Vohra,
with the appealing features of a geometric criterion emphasized in the work of Chung and
Olszewski. For instance, Example 4.16 showed how Corollary 4.15 can be used to study on
which parts of the type space RE holds and where it fails, thereby characterizing the subsets
of IC mechanisms which are RE and non-RE.
We conclude this section with two examples aiming to build economic intuition for our
geometric theory. The first provides a geometric construction of the extremal payments of
[KM13], the second shows that our theory can be used to understand how the geometry of
cells interplays with the ability of the mechanism designer to distribute information rents in
the absence of RE.
Example 4.19 (Equilibrium utility and extremal payments). Consider the outcome function
g from Example 3.13. Following Remark 3.10 we normalize with respect to outcome 1, thus
types and prices are depicted as cosets t = [(0, t2 − t1, t3 − t1)], p = [(0, p2 − p1, p3 − p1)].
If we choose a payment coset p = [(0, p2 − p1, p3 − p1)] ∈ P
↑(g) and p˜1 ∈ R, we can fix the
representative p˜ ∈ p with first coordinate p˜1 to be the mechanism’s payment function. Then
the equilibrium utility function is given by
u([g(t), p(t)], t) = (t− p˜)g(t) = (tj − t1)− (p˜j − p˜1) + t1 − p˜1 for t ∈ g
−1(j).
Geometrically this is the difference of the projections of t−p onto the j’th axis, normalized by
t1− p˜1. The extremal payments of [KM13] for g with “anchor type” t˜ ∈ g
−1(1) are calculated
geometrically as follows. For each type in g−1(j), the lower bound is the maximal j’th axis-
aligned difference to the vectors in the payment simplex P↑(g), with p˜1 = t˜1. Similarly the
upper bound is calculated as the axis-aligned minimal difference to vectors in the simplex.
It is easy to see that the lower and upper bound are the representatives of the vectors in
the faces of P↑(g) supported by [(0,−1,−1)] and [(0, 1, 1)], respectively, with p˜1 = t˜1 as first
coordinate. These payments bound any IC payment rule.
Example 4.20 (Equilibrium utility for non-RE mechanisms). The purpose of this example
is to illustrate how the geometry of cells determines the freedom of mechanisms to choose
equilibrium utilities in the absence of RE. Note that the geometry of payment simplices
in tconv(T ) is very restricted, only cells with facet normals ei − ej , for i 6= j and ±ei in
R
m−1 can arise, [JK10, Tra17]. Via (1) each point in a payment simplex corresponds to
some feasible utility function under the outcome function. In economics terms, the subset
of directions occurring in the relative interior of a cell determine how the mechanism can
trade off equilibrium utilities between types. Consider for instance the outcome function
g from Example 3.13. Any payment p = [(0, p2 − p1, p3 − p1)] in the relative interior of
P↑(g) can be perturbed in the direction of [(0, 1, 0)] and [(0, 0, 1)] within the cell so that
the mechanism can perturb the utility of types in g−1(2) and g−1(3) independently of each
other. Moreover the normalizing coordinate p1 can be set freely without changing the coset
of p, so that also the utility of types in g−1(1) can be chosen. In contrast lower-dimensional
payment sets limit the ability of the mechanism to distribute utility. Consider Figure 6 (b).
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As noted in Example 4.16, the cells in the two dashed triangular regions are lines in the
[(0, 0, 1)] direction. We depicted two max-plus hyperplanes (dotted) that can be used to
define the same IC surjective outcome function. The mechanism designer can extract utility
of the types receiving outcome 3 by perturbing prices in the [(0, 0, 1)] direction within this
cell, but cannot extract utility from types receiving outcome 2 without changing the outcome
function.
While the geometry of payment simplices is determined by the geometry of the type space
as a whole, each simplex is completely specified by its generating payments. Hence, the
generating payments are sufficient to study all feasible equilibrium utility functions under a
given outcome function. For recent works on mechanism design without revenue equivalence
we refer to [KM13,CE13]. We also point to the works of [Mye81,Rah,CX13,HN06,MR92]
for detailed studies of rent and surplus extraction using other techniques.
5. Characterization of Feasible Allocation Matrices
The allocation matrix defined in (8) plays a prominent role in the verification of IC and
RE. It encodes important properties of an outcome function, such as weak monotonicity, IC,
supporting payments and RE. Yet characterizations based on it are implicit by nature of its
definition. To remedy this, two essential hurdles need to be overcome. Firstly, given a type
set T and matrix a L, we need a criterion to decide whether L is induced by some outcome
function g : T → [m]. In other words, we must characterize the image g 7→ Lg. We shall
call such matrices realizable. Secondly, if L is realizable, a method to construct the functions
that realize it is desirable. Theorem 5.2 resolves these two questions. It thus moves the focus
from studying outcome functions to analyzing specific matrices.
For ease of exposition, we shall assume that g : T → [m] is an onto outcome function. This
is without loss, as any outcome function is onto upon projecting the type space. We note
however that the theorem can be adapted to the general case at the expense of additional
notation.
5.1. Realizability of allocation matrices. Let L be a m ×m matrix with zero diagonal
and write Lj for its j’th column. To economize on notation we shall write Lj := Hj(Lj),
Lj := Hj(Lj) and Ljk := Hjk(Lj). For sets A,B ⊂ R
m, write d(A,B) for the infimum of the
euclidean distance between pairs of points in these sets.
Definition 5.1. For j, k ∈ [m], j 6= k, define Ijk = Ljk ∩ T . A (j, k)-witness is a sequence
{sj,r : r ≥ 1} ⊆ T ∩ L
◦
j such that
lim
r→∞
d(sj,r,Ljk) = 0.
We say that L separates T at (j, k) if
d(T ∩ Lj,Ljk) = 0, (13)
and in addition, whenever Ijk = Ikj = {s} for some s ∈ TA
m−1, then there exists a (j, k)-
witness or a (k, j)-witness. Say that L separates T if L separates T for all j, k ∈ [m], j 6= k.
Given a matrix L ∈ Rm×m, we will say that L is realized by g if L is the allocation matrix
Lg for some outcome function g : T → [m]. We shall call L realizable if it is realized by
some g.
TROPICAL GEOMETRY AND MECHANISM DESIGN 21
Theorem 5.2. Fix a type space T ⊂ Rm. Let L ∈ Rm×m be a matrix with zero diagonal.
Then L is realizable if and only if L separates T , and
T ⊆
m⋃
k=1
Lk.
Theorem 5.2 demonstrates how network flow problems can be studied geometrically. As
discussed in the introduction, one issue with the characterization of IC based on cycle lengths
is the lack of an inverse construction. The proof of Theorem 5.2 is constructive: it yields an
outcome function g such that L = Lg.
Corollary 5.3. Let L = Lg ∈ Rm×m be the allocation matrix of some (not necessarily IC)
outcome function g : T → [m]. Then
P(g) =
m⋂
k∈1
Lk. (14)
In particular, g is IC if and only if this intersection is non-empty.
3
3
3
1
1
2
2
p
L1 L2
L3
(a) Generic types labeled by a mechanism
L1
L2L3
(b) The geometry of IC payments
Figure 7. Geometric construction of allocation matrices. The type set con-
sists of the black dots that are apices of the min-plus hyperplanes drawn using
dashed lines. In Panel (a), types have been labeled according to their outcome
under an outcome function g. In Panel (b), the gray dots are the rows of the
matrix Lg, viewed as points in TA2. The set of IC payments of g is shaded
gray in both panels. Figure accompanies Example 5.4.
Example 5.4 (Geometric construction of allocation matrices). Figure 7 (a) shows how to
construct the apices of the sectors Li geometrically. The set T consists of the generic black
points. The dashed lines are hyperplanes of H(−T ). The labels next to the points define an
outcome function g : T → [3]. For i ∈ [3], the heavy black lines define the boundary of the
max-plus sectors Li, whose apex is the i-th row of L
g. For example, for i = 1, the first row of
Lg can be written as Lg1 = (0, supt∈g−1(1){t2− t1}, supt∈g−1(1){t3− t1}). The set P(g) equals
the cell shaded gray, computed using Proposition 3.6 and Definition 3.5. Panel(b) verifies
that this cell equals
⋂3
i=1 Li, as stipulated by Corollary 5.3.
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t4
t3
t1
t2 L3
L1
L2
(a) Realizable with outcome function g
where g(t1) = 1, g(t2) = g(t3) = 3, g(t4) = 2.
t4
t3
t1
t2 L3
L1
L2
(b) Not realizable: there is no (1, 3)- nor
(3, 1)-witness, so L does not separate T .
Figure 8. Realizable and non-realizable matrices, defined by the apices of Li
for i ∈ [3]. Figure accompanies Example 5.5.
Example 5.5 (Realizable and non-realizable matrices). In Figure 8, the set of four black
points is the type space T = {t1, t2, t3, t4}. Each panel defines a matrix L whose rows are
the apices of the sectors L1,L2 and L3 depicted using black lines. The matrix in Panel (a)
is realizable: it equals Lg for the mechanism g defined by g(t2) = g(t3) = 3, g(t1) = 1 and
g(t4) = 2. The matrix L in Panel (b) is not realizable. Suppose for a contradiction that
it were realized by some outcome function g. By Theorem 5.2, we would require g(t4) = 2,
g(t1) = 1, g(t3) = 3, and g(t2) taking value either 1 or 3. If g(t2) = 3, then L
g must equal
the matrix shown in Figure 8 (a) which is different from L. So g(t2) = 1, but for this
g, H(−Lg3) equals the sector depicted with the dashed lines, and hence L
g 6= L. Thus L
is not realizable. Realizability fails since L does not separate T at {1, 3}. Here, one has
I13 = L13 ∩ L31 ∩ T = {t2}, but there is no (1, 3)- nor a (3, 1)-witness.
5.2. Weak Monotonicity. Recall that an outcome function g is said to be weakly monotone
or two-cycle monotone if the matrix Lg + (Lg)⊤ is element-wise nonnegative. Using tropical
geometry, this algebraic condition on Lg is translated into the following geometric criterion
on the row vectors of Lg and the min-plus arrangement H(−T ).
Proposition 5.6. Fix a type space T ⊂ Rm. Let L = Lg ∈ Rm×m be the allocation matrix
of some (not necessarily IC) outcome function g : T → [m]. Then g is weakly monotone if
and only if the open sets L
◦
1, . . . ,L
◦
m are pairwise disjoint.
It is known that weak monotonicity is generally not sufficient for IC, inspiring a still
evolving literature identifying conditions on the type space when it is, see [SY05,BCL+06,
ABHM10,AK08, JMS96,KG16]. Together, Corollary 5.3 and Proposition 5.6 indicate geo-
metric constraints on the type space for weak monotonicity to imply cyclical monotonicity.
More generally, any weakening of cyclical monotonicity requires finding conditions under
which a non-empty intersection of subsets of the sectors Li already implies non-emptiness of
the intersection of all sectors Li.
Example 5.7 (Weak monotonicity, IC and an RE type space). In Figure 9, the set T
consists of all points in the gray shaded region. On this type space not all weakly mono-
tone outcome functions on T are IC. On convex type spaces this cannot happen cf. [SY05].
Panel (a) defines a weakly monotone outcome function via Lg. Weak monotonicity follows
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L3
L2
L1
(a) A mechanism that is weakly
monotone but not IC.
L3
L2
L1
(b) The min-plus sectors verify-
ing non-IC.
L3
L2L1
(c) On the same type space, an-
other mechanism that is RE.
Figure 9. Demonstration of weak monotonicity, lack of incentive compatibil-
ity, on a revenue equivalent domain. Figure accompanies Example 5.7.
from Proposition 5.6, since the open sectors L
◦
1,L
◦
2,L
◦
3 are pairwise disjoint. Panel (b) verifies
that Eig
0
(Lg) = ∅ via Corollary 5.3, so g is not IC. Using the dimension graph one confirms
that T is RE using Corollary 4.18. Note that if this type space were unbounded, then its clo-
sure would neither be path-connected, nor ‘boundedly grid-wise connected’, which are other
known and easily verified sufficient conditions for a type space to be RE, cf. [CO07, Theorems
1 and 4]. See Section 6.2 on how to extend our theorems to such type spaces.
6. Extensions
6.1. Multiplayer mechanisms. We give the generalization of Theorem 4.1 to multiplayer,
dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms. In this case, the matrix that represents
the outcome function g and the covector of a cell of H(−T ) are generalized to tensors. Let us
elaborate. Suppose that there are n ∈ N players, each player i ∈ [n] has type space Ti ⊂ R
m.
A multiplayer mechanism is a pair (g, p), with outcome function g : T1 × · · · × Tn → [m]
and payment p : T1 × · · · × Tn → R
m×n. Say that (g, p) is dominant strategy incentive
compatible (D-IC) if for each player i ∈ [n], for each possible announcement t−i ∈
∏
i 6=j Tj of
the other players, the induced mechanism for player i is IC. View g as a tensor of dimension
m× T1 × · · · × Tn having entries in {0, 1}, where gk,t1,...tn = 1 if and only if g(t1, . . . , tn) = k.
Define a multiple covector ν to be a tensor of dimension m × T1 × · · · × Tn with entries in
{0, 1} such that for each t−i ∈ T−i, the axis-aligned sub-matrix ν•,•,t−i of dimension m×Ti is
a covector of H(−Ti). The following is immediate from the definition of D-IC for multiplayer
outcomes.
Proposition 6.1. The outcome function g is incentive compatible if and only if for each
i ∈ [n], every axis-aligned submatrix of dimension m × Ti is contained in the covector of
some cell in tconv(Ti).
Example 6.2 (Multiplayer Case). Let n = 2, T1 = T2 with ri = 3. Figure 10 depicts the
arrangements H(Ti). For this two player example it is notationally convenient to use the
following covector convention. We identify a covector matrix coVecTi(q) of dimension 3 × 3
with a vector (S1, S2, S3) of subsets of [3], with k ∈ Sl, if and only if q ∈ Hk(−tl), if and
only if coVecTi(q)l,tk = 1. This identification extends to the 3 × 3 × 3 tensor corresponding
TROPICAL GEOMETRY AND MECHANISM DESIGN 24
to an outcome function giving a 3× 3 matrix whose entries are singleton subsets of [3]. Let
g : T1×T2 → [3] be an outcome-function. Upon identifying, Proposition 6.1 then states that
each column and row of this 3 × 3 matrix g is a covector of a full-dimensional cell of the
arrangement H(−T1) and H(−T2), respectively.
Some examples of dominant strategy incentive compatible outcome functions are the fol-
lowing matrices, whose rows are labeled by the types of player 1, t1,1, t1,2, t1,3 and the columns
by the types of player 2, t2,1, t2,2, t2,3
f =

3 3 13 1 2
1 2 2

 , g =

3 3 13 1 1
1 2 2

 , h =

3 3 33 1 2
3 1 2

 .
Each column is a covector of the arrangement on T1, each row is a covector of the arrange-
ment on T2, thus, f, g, h are DIC.
(1, 2, 2)
(3, 1, 2)
(3, 3, 1)
(3, 2, 2)
t1,1
t1,2
t1,3
(a) Arrangement of Player 1 on T1.
(1, 2, 2) (1, 1, 2)
(3, 1, 2) (3, 1, 1)
(3, 3, 1)
(3, 3, 3)
t2,1
t2,2
t2,3
(b) Arrangement of Player 2 on T2.
Figure 10. Here T1 = {t1,1, t1,2, t1,3} and T2 = {t2,1, t2,2, t2,3}. The min-plus
arrangements H(−T1) and H(−T2) are depicted in the left and right panels
respectively.
6.2. General type spaces. Thus far the main results of our paper, Theorems 4.1, 4.11
and 5.2 have been stated for compact type spaces T . Some results also require T to be
tropically generic (cf. Corollary 4.2). In this section we demonstrate how these results can
be generalized through examples. In particular, Examples 6.3 and 6.4 show the pathologies
that can occur with non-compact or non-generic type spaces, while Examples 6.5 and 6.6 show
how to extend the theory to these cases via generic perturbations and finite approximations.
It is straight forward to formalize the ideas in these examples using standard techniques.
One can directly adapt the definitions to apply to non-compact type spaces as follows.
Example 6.3 (Type spaces with compact closure). Consider the type space
T = {(0, 1/n, 1/n) : n ∈ N} ∪ {(0,−1, 0)}}.
As a subset of R3 this type set is not closed, since (0, 0, 0) is a limit point which is not in T . In
fact, T ∪{(0, 0, 0)} is the closure of T and compact. Now suppose we were to define tconv(T )
as we did in Definition 3.4. Observe that this is no longer a polyhedral complex. Indeed, the
polyhedron conv((0,−1, 0), (0, 0, 0)) + R ·(1, . . . , 1), where conv denotes the ordinary convex
hull, is a face of σ =
(⋂
n∈NH1(0, 1/n, 1/n)
)
∩ H2(0,−1, 0) ∈ H(−T ) but not contained
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in H(−t). This face is only a cell upon considering the intersection of all sectors in the
arrangement on the closure T ∪ {(0, 0, 0)}.
To deal with type spaces whose closure is compact, two ways present themselves, (i) ap-
plying Definition 3.4to the topological closure of T , (ii) defining tconv(T ) as the smallest
polyhedral complex containing all bounded cells of H(−T ). In fact, one can show that the
tropical polytope in the sense of Definition 3.4 of the closure of a bounded type space agrees
with the smallest polyhedral complex on T containing the intersection of all sectors.
While either approach is a valid way forward, we emphasize one subtlety. The definition
of the dimension-graph needs to be adapted if proceeding as in (ii). To see this, note that
(0, 0, 0) would have to be a cell in either case, but this point is present only in the closure
of T , so the dimension graph of (0, 0, 0) would be connected if the tropical polytope were
defined as in (i), but not if it is defined as in (ii). This problem is resolved by defining the
dimension graph as the undirected graph on m nodes with edge (i, j) if and only if
dist(Hij(−p),Hi(−p) ∩ T ) = 0.
It is easy to see that this agrees with (12) when T is compact, but is well defined for any
type space. Adapting our theorems to the strongly connected components of the dimension
graph is then straight forward.
Example 6.4 (Type spaces without compact closure). Suppose the type space is given by
T = {(0, n,m) : n,m ∈ N}.
Clearly, any mechanism that is not onto requires some prices to be infinite. Thus we must
consider the closure of T in (R∪{+∞})m\{(+∞, . . . ,+∞)}. The notion of tropical polytopes
and covectors of [DS04] generalizes to this case, see [FR15,JL16]. In particular [JL16, Section
3.5] defines a covector in this case, which can be used to extend the present theory. The
obstacle to overcome is that the notion of “bounded cells” to apply Definition 3.4 is ill
defined for any cell cells containing points with infinite coordinates. This problem can be
resolved by viewing the “boundary”, i.e. the set of points with infinite coordinates as lower-
dimensional affine copies of Rd for d < m. Since this extension requires notation that is
somewhat involved we prefer to restrict attention to the compact case in this paper. We
wish to point out one subtlety of tropical arithmetic however. While we could use the min
and max convention interchangeably in TAm−1, this is no longer the case when admitting
infinite values, since the generalization of tropical affine space, called the tropical projective
torus depends on choice of tropical addition (by adding +∞ instead of −∞ which are the
additive identities for ⊕ and ⊕, respectively).
We remark, that defining the tropical polytope on T as in (ii) of Example 6.3, one can
apply our theory by considering only outcome functions with finite prices, and considering
projections to obtain any outcome function that is not onto, thus not having to explicitly
handle the subtleties posed by allowing for infinite prices.
This case can also be handled using generic perturbations.
Example 6.5 (Limiting approximation). The set T ⊂ TA2 in Figure 2 Panel (b) consists
of the three parallel lines. This set can be approximated as the limit of a finite sequence
(T k), we schematically depicted T 21 by the black points in Panel (a), together with tropical
polytope tconv(T 21) shaded gray. Panel (b) depicts the limit. It can be shown that the
tropical polytopes converge as polyhedral complexes in the Hausdorff distance based on the
Euclidean distance.
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t1
t3
t2
S
(a) Non-generic arrangement
t′1
t3
t2
S′
(b) A generic perturbation
t1
t′′3
t2
S′′
(c) Another perturbation
Figure 11. A non-generic arrangement on three types and possible generic
perturbations thereof. The cells shaded gray support onto mechanisms. Figure
accompanies Example 6.6.
Example 6.6 (Generic perturbation of finite point-configurations). Figure 11 depicts ar-
rangements on three points. The points in Panel (a) are not generic: the projections of
t1 and t3 onto the first coordinate is a point. Panels (b) and (c) show possible generic
perturbations of these points. The covectors of the cells shaded gray are
coVecT (S) =

1 0 11 0 1
0 1 0

 , coVecL(S ′) =

0 0 11 0 0
0 1 0

 , coVecL(S ′′) =

1 0 00 0 1
0 1 0


The cells S ′ and S ′′ are full-dimensional and thus support surjective outcome functions by
Corollary 4.2. Indeed, their covectors are the outcome functions g and h respectively, with
g(t′1) = 2, g(t2) = 3, g(t3) = 1 and h(t1) = 1, h(t2) = 3, h(t
′′
3) = 2. The cell S in Panel (a) can
be seen as a limit of S ′ as t′1 approaches t1, or as the limit of S
′′ as t′′3 approaches t3. It supports
the surjective outcome functions g and h, that is P (ν(g)) = P (ν(h)) = P (coVecT (S)).
We remark that by combining the two proceed examples one can choose finite and generic
sequences of points that approximate any given type space and apply the present theory
to these approximations. Thus, while there no longer is a bijection between onto outcome
functions and full-dimensional cells of the tropical polytope in the non-generic case, what
remains true is that a cell supports an onto outcome function if and only it it is obtainable as a
limit of full-dimensional bounded cells of finite generic approximations. Generic perturbations
are a standard technique in tropical geometry, see [MS15].
7. Proofs
7.1. Proofs of results in Section 3.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. Fix p ∈ Rm and pick g ∈ G(p). Since (g, p) is IC, we have for
g(t) = i, the inequality
ti − pi ≤ tj − pj ∀j ∈ [m], j 6= i. (15)
Therefore, p ∈ Hi(−t) by definition of Hi(−t) so that coVecT(p) contains the edge (t, i). This
shows that g is a subgraph of coVecT(p). Conversely, suppose the graph of g is a subgraph
of coVecT(p). By hypothesis g is a well-defined outcome function, so each t ∈ T is assigned
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to some g(t) ∈ [m]. Choose t ∈ T and suppose g(t) = i. Since p ∈ Hi(−t) the relation (15)
holds and (g, p) is IC. Thus g ∈ G(p), as claimed. 
We will make repeated use of Corollary 12 in [DS04], which we state here for ease of
reference.
Lemma 7.1 ([DS04, Corollary 12]). A cell σ ∈ H(−T ) is bounded modulo addition of con-
stants if and only if for all i ∈ [m] there is t ∈ T such that σ ⊂ Hi(−t).
Proof of Proposition 3.6. If [g] = [m], then πg is a the identity function, and the statement
is trivial. Suppose [g] is a strict subset of [m]. If g is not IC, then P↑(g) = P(g) = ∅, and
the statement is again trivial. Thus, we shall assume that g is IC and [g] is a strict subset
of [m]. Consider the polyhedron σ =
⋂
t∈T Hg(t)(−t). By IC σ is non-empty and thus a cell
in H(−T ). However, since g is not onto, σ is unbounded modulo addition of constants by
the foregoing lemma. Thus, by definition, P↑(g) ∈ tconv(T ) is obtained by restricting σ to
tconv(T ). Again by the foregoing lemma, for each j ∈ [m]\[g] there must be some s ∈ T such
that P↑(g) ⊂ Hj(−s). If we define g(s) = ij , if follows that P
↑(g) ⊂ Hj(−s) ∩ Hij(−s), i.e.
qij −qj = c
j with cj = sij −sj is valid for all q ∈ P
↑(g). This also shows that the constants cj
cannot depend on the choice of s. Now suppose p ∈ P(g), lift it to p¯ ∈ Rm by setting p¯i = pi
if i ∈ [g], and
p¯j = pij − c
j
if j ∈ [m]\[g]. The definition of the lift shows that p¯ ∈ P↑(g). We now claim that the lift
is an affine isomorphism. It is clear that the map is affine. Obviously, if q ∈ P(g), then
πg(p¯) = p. To conclude, we claim that if q ∈ P
↑(g), then the lift of πg(q) is again q. But this
is immediate, since all q ∈ P↑(g) satisfy the linear relation that was used to construct the
lift. 
Proof of Proposition 3.8. First suppose σ ∈ H(−T ) is a full-dimensional cell and let ν denote
its covector. Pick p ∈ int(σ), by definition p ∈
⋂
(i,t)∈ν int(Hi(−t)), i.e. pi − ti < pj − tj for
all (i, t) ∈ ν and j 6= i. This shows that for each t ∈ T there is a unique index i that
attains the minimum j 7→ pj − tj. In other words, for each t ∈ T there is a unique index
i ∈ [m] such that νit = 1 and νjt = 0 for j 6= i. Defining g(t) = i if and only if νit = 1 gives
a well-defined and IC outcome-function, so that (6) is the only outcome function that is a
subgraph of coVecT(σ). For the converse, suppose that σ is not full-dimensional. As H(−T )
is a polyhedral complex, σ equals the intersection of at least two full-dimensional cells ν1, ν2
of H(−T ). If f1 is the unique IC outcome associated to ν1, and f2 is the unique IC outcome
associated to ν2, then f1, f2 are both subgraphs of coVecT(σ). Therefore, σ has more than
one IC outcome function associated with it. 
7.2. Proofs of results in Section 4.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. If σ is a full-dimensional cell, then the claim follows from Proposition
3.8. For the converse direction, suppose g is an IC outcome function. Then by IC, the
polyhedron
σ =
⋂
t∈T
Hg(t)(−t)
is non-empty and a cell ofH(−T ). We now claim that σ is full-dimensional. If not, then there
are i 6= j and a c ∈ R such that pi−pj = c is valid for all p ∈ σ, equivalently σ ⊂ Hij(−t) for
some t ∈ T . Since g is a function, there must be t 6= t′ with ti− tj = t
′
i− t
′
j = c. Projecting T
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onto coordinates i and j, we found t and t′ on a tropical hyperplane contradicting genericity
of T . Hence σ must be full-dimensional. The final claim is clear from the definition of
P↑(g). 
Proof of Corollary 4.2. This follows from Theorem 4.1 and [DS04, Corollary 12]. 
The following is an adaptation of [DS04, Prop. 17].
Lemma 7.2. Let σ ∈ H(−T ) be a cell, and p a point in its relative interior. The number of
connected components of the dimension graph of p equals the dimension of σ as a polyhedron
in Rm.
Proof. Let σ be a cell in H(−T ) and let ν denote its covector. Then
σ =
⋂
t∈T
Hi∈ν(t)(−t).
Note that the dimension graph is completely determined by the covector namely,
{i, j} is an edge ⇔ Hij(−p) ∩ T 6= ∅ ⇔ there is t ∈ T with νit = νjt = 1.
We will use induction on the dimension. First suppose that the dimension of σ is m,
the maximal possible. This means that the interior of σ is non-empty. Pick p ∈ int(σ), by
definition there is an ǫ > 0 such that such that ti−pi > tj−pj+ǫ for all (i, t) ∈ ν and all i 6= j.
Clearly this implies that Hij(−p) ∩ T = ∅ and the dimension graph is totally disconnected.
For the converse direction, assume the dimension graph of p is totally disconnected. Fix
i ∈ [m], then by the compactness of T ∩ Hi(p) we find an ǫi > 0 such that
tj − pj ≥ ti − pi + ǫi
for all t ∈ T such that (i, t) ∈ ν. Letting ǫ be the minimum of ǫ1, . . . , ǫm, we see that p
contains an open ǫ-neighborhood in σ, so that σ is full-dimensional.
Now suppose there is a t ∈ T with σ ⊂ Hij(−t). This is the case if and only if for some
t ∈ T and c := ti − tj , pi − pj = c is valid for all p ∈ σ. Projecting out coordinate j we
obtain σ′ ⊂ Rm−1 which is affinely isomorphic to σ, so that both have the same dimension.
Consider now the tropically linear map TAm−1 → TAm−2 defined by x′k = xk for k 6= i, j and
x′i = max{xi, xj + c}. Denote the image of T by T
′ and the image of p ∈ σ by p′. We now
claim that σ′ is a cell in H(−T ′) which is tropically isomorphic to σ. Indeed, for (i, t) ∈ ν,
we have ti = tj − (pj − pi) = tj − c. So t
′
i = ti if (i, t) ∈ ν. Thus ν
′
kt′ = νkt for k 6= i, j and
ν ′it′ = 1 if and only if νit = 1 or νjt = 1 is the covector of p
′ with respect to T ′. Thus ν ′ is
the covector of σ′ with respect to T ′. The dimension graph of p′ ∈ σ′ with respect to T ′ is
obtained by contracting the edge {i, j}. Now induct on the dimension. 
Proof of Theorem 4.11. Let g : T → [m] be an IC outcome function. By Lemma 7.2, the
dimension of P↑(g) equals the number of connected components of its dimension graph. Since
P↑(g) is a cell, it is a tropical simplex whose generators equals the dimension in Rm, [JK10,
Theorem 7]. Hence also its tropical dimension equals the number of connected components
of its dimension graph. 
Proof of Corollary 4.18. If T is RE, then for every p ∈ tconv(T ), its dimension graph equals
that of some RE mechanism (g, p) by Proposition 3.3 which is connected by hypothesis.
Conversely, suppose the dimension graph of every p in tconv(T ) is connected. Take a IC
mechanism (g, p), with p in the relative interior of P(g). As its dimension graph is connected,
Eig(Lg) = {p}, so (g, p) is RE. 
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7.3. Proofs of results in Section 5.
Proof of Theorem 5.2. Suppose L is realized by g. For each j = 1, 2, . . . , m, g−1(j) ⊆ Lj,
since maxk∈[m](Ljk + tk) = Lj⊙t = tj . The sets g
−1(1), . . . , g−1(m) partition T , so T ⊆⋃m
j=1Lj. It remains to show that L separates T at an arbitrary pair {j, k}, where j, k ∈
[m], j 6= k. We have that d(T∩Lj ,Ljk) = 0 since Ljk = inft∈g−1(j){tj−tk}. If Ijk = Ikj = {s},
then if g(s) = j, the infimum in the definition of Lkj must be achieved by a (k, j)-witness,
so there must exist a (k, j)-witness. Conversely, if g(s) = k, then there must exist a (j, k)-
witness. This shows that L separates T at {j, k}, as desired. For the converse direction,
suppose L is a matrix with zero diagonal such that T ⊆
⋃m
j=1Lj and L separates T . Define
g : T → [m] as follows. For a point t ∈ T ∩ L
◦
j , let g(t) = j. The remaining points must
lie on
⋃
j,k∈[m],j 6=k Ijk by definition of Ijk’s. Assign these points such that points on Ijk have
either outcome j or k, and such that on every non-empty boundary Ijk there exists a point
with outcome j. The only case where this cannot be done is if Ijk = Ikj = {s}. In this
case, if there is a (j, k)-witness, set g(s) = k, else, since L separates T , there must exists a
(k, j)-witness, so set g(s) = j. We claim that L is realized by g. Fix j, k ∈ [m], j 6= k. By
definition of g−1(j),
inf
s∈g−1(j)
(sj − sk) ≥ Ljk. (16)
Furthermore, there must be a point in Ijk or a (j, k)-witness in g
−1(j). So (16) holds with
an equality, thus L = Lg, as claimed. 
Proof of Proposition 5.6. Fix a pair of indices j, k ∈ [m], j 6= k. We claim that
Ljk + Lkj > 0⇔ Lj ∩ Lk = ∅,
Ljk + Lkj = 0⇔ Lj ∩ Lk on their boundaries, i.e. Lj ∩ Lk = ∂Lj ∩ ∂Lk
Ljk + Lkj < 0⇔ Lj ∩ Lk in their interiors, i.e. L
◦
j ∩ L
◦
k 6= ∅.
This claim implies statement (4) by definition of weakly monotone. Now let us prove the
claim. Note that Lj and Lk are closed polyhedra, so they either do not intersect, intersect
on their boundaries, or intersect in their interiors. So it is sufficient to prove the last two
equivalences in the statements. Suppose there exists t ∈ Lj ∩ Lk. Then by definition of the
sectors,
Ljk + Lkj ≤ (tj − tk) + (tk − tj) = 0.
In particular, strict equality holds if and only if t lies on the boundary of Lj ∩Lk, while strict
inequality holds if and only if t lies in either of their interiors. In that case, one can pick a
t′ ∈ L
◦
j ∩L
◦
k, then Ljk+Lkj < (t
′
j− t
′
k)+(t
′
k− t
′
j) = 0. This proves the desired statement. 
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9. Conclusion
In this paper we developed a geometric theory of incentive compatibility that naturally
reflects economic incentives, Section 3.2 and Theorem 4.1. Our approach uses tropical geom-
etry, which combines algebraic and geometric techniques, providing a framework for mecha-
nism design not utilized prior. Importantly, it is this interplay of techniques which allowed us
to give a systematic characterization of all IC prices of an outcome function, Theorems 4.8
and 4.11, and let us show how to use cyclical monotonicity constructively, Theorem 5.2.
These results manifest the conceptual novelty of the tropical view on mechanism design and
its utility, beyond supplying a complementary view on the network flow approach to mecha-
nism design [Roc87,Voh11]. We remark that our theory applies equally to mechanism design
with and without money, and is multidimensional from the outset. Importantly, our char-
acterization of IC payments can be used to analyze mechanisms in the absence of revenue
equivalence, cf. Example 4.20.
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